WEMO 2025 (complet) - Flipbook - Page 44
W E M O 202 5
O U T LO O K
√ The 12-day war between Israel and Iran, aimed at preventing
Iran’s nuclear weapon development, occurred in a
region rich in oil and gas production. Thanks to shale oil
and shale gas, the United States became the first oil
producer globally318 and the top LNG exporter319. It
was thus able to support Israel’s 2025 military actions
without concerns about Middle East oil supply disruption.
While its importance has decreased, the Strait of Hormuz
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=61545
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=64844
320
https://www.iea.org/reports/oil-market-report-june-2025
321
https://www.arbatcapital.com/post/oil-market-report-june-2025
322
https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/how-houthi-attacks-red-sea-threaten-global-shipping
323
https://procurementmag.com/supply-chain-management/red-sea-disruption-trade
318
the reasons analyzed above, oil prices remained stable.
On the gas trade side, since early 2024, LNG tankers have avoided
the Red Sea route, rerouting around Africa. The avoidance of
the Red Sea route by LNG tankers has allowed Qatar to keep
its LNG deliveries in the Paci昀椀c, while U.S. LNG stays in the
Atlantic. In the 昀椀rst half of 2025, the U.S. exported roughly
80% of its LNG to Europe. Qatar exported 80% to Asia. Qatar
is bene昀椀ting from this fragmentation of global LNG trade as it
spares Doha from competing with U.S. volumes head-on325.
The US position as top oil and gas supplier, a weak global
oil demand growth in 2025 (~0.7% annually)320, high
global oil stocks (~7. 7 mb)321, and Saudi Arabia and the
UAE signaling their readiness to increase their oil output
if needed, are the main causes of this moderate growth.
After the end of the 12-day war, Brent crude price
dropped and stabilized at $67/bl below the pre-war level.
As analyzed above, in 2024 and early 2025, China solidi昀椀ed
its global leadership in all green technologies including
renewable energies, nuclear energy, electric batteries and
green hydrogen. In reaction, the European Union is trying to
implement a sovereignty policy.
The moderate e昀昀ect on oil prices during the war highlights
the Middle East's declining influence on oil prices.
Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping disrupted ~12% of
global seaborne oil trade322, forcing reroutes around
Africa and adding an extra 10 to 14 days to the traditional
30 to 40-day trip from Asia to Europe. 323 This raised
shipping rates by 200-400%324. Despite those attacks, for
319
324
https://www.eezyimport.com/red-sea-shipping-crisis-recent-houthi-attacks-and-globalimplications/#:~:text=200%2D400%25%20rate%20increases%20on,East%20Coast%20rates%20
increased%20120%25
325
https://www.barrons.com/articles/houthis-china-iran-shipping-ca577a16?st=7mWnNy
√ President Trump’s 2025 election led to a signi昀椀cant overhaul of
U.S. energy policy, favoring fossil fuel expansion and imposing
high tari昀昀s on clean technologies. This new policy re昀氀ects both
a sovereignty approach and climate change skepticism. It has
already had an important impact both in the US and globally.
Let’s look more precisely at the impact of these geoplitical
tensions on energy.
WEMO 2025
√ Throughout 2024 and the 昀椀rst half of 2025, geopolitical
tensions escalated, driven by the Russia-Ukraine
war and Middle East conflicts. Control over energy
resources and critical raw materials has fuelled these
con昀氀icts, which, in turn, have disrupted their supply chains.
One motive for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine may have been
to secure rare earth deposits, gas transit pipelines, and oil
昀椀elds in Crimea. The strategic agreement signed between the
United States and Ukraine in 2025 supports this analysis. The
ongoing Russia-Ukraine con昀氀ict prompted new EU sanctions
on Russian gas. This war threat, combined with reduced U.S.
NATO funding, is pushing European countries to increase their
defense budgets.
remains a critical chokepoint for global energy trade,
with approximately 20% of the world’s oil and 20% of
global (LNG) passing through it. Due to a combination of
economic self-interest, pressure from its client China, fear
of U.S. retaliation and weakened military capacity, Iran
did not close the Strait of Hormuz during the 12-day war.
During this con昀氀ict oil prices rose moderately with Brent crude
rising from ~$69 /bl to ~$81/bl, far below potential spikes that
could have resulted from a disruption of the Strait of Hormuz.
43
The geopolitical impacts on the
energy sector
